The authors explored the validity of two perspectives as to how managers evaluate subordinates who resist downward influence attempts: a uniformly dysfunctional perspective (i.e., managers regard all manifestations of resistance as indicators of ineffective influence and rate subordinates unfavorably when they resist) and a multifunctional perspective (i.e., managers regard some manifestations of resistance as more constructive than others and rate subordinates more favorably when they employ constructive resistance tactics). The results of two studies provided support for an interactive model, which predicts that the uniformly dysfunctional perspective is characteristic of lower quality leader-member exchange (LMX) relationships and that the multifunctional perspective is characteristic of higher quality leader-member exchanges.
One of the promising approaches to understanding managerial leadership focuses on downward influence, managers' attempts to exercise social control over subordinates' perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors. This research stream has identified the means by which managers influence their subordinates (e.g., Kipnis, Schmidt, & Wilkinson, 1980) , how subordinates respond to managers' downward influence attempts (e.g., Yukl, Kim, & Falbe, 1996; Yukl & Tracey, 1992) , and the outcomes associated with different kinds of responses to downward influence attempts (Falbe & Yukl, 1992 ). An important but relatively unexplored aspect of downward influence processes has to do with instances in which subordinates resist their managers' requests (Yukl, Fu, & McDonald, 2003) . In particular, little is known about managers' perceptions of, and responses to, subordinates' resistance.
In the sections that follow, we argue that management researchers have implicitly advanced what appear to be competing perspectives as to how managers perceive subordinates' resistance in formal organizations. According to the first perspective, managers regard subordinates' resistance as uniformly dysfunctional, that is, managers regard all manifestations of resistance as indicators of ineffective influence. The second perspective suggests that subordinates' resistance is multifunctional in the sense that managers regard some manifestations of resistance as being more constructive than others. Next, we develop the notion that each perspective has some validity but that each is likely to be supported in different situations. Specifically, we argue that managers' perceptions of subordinates' resistance in lower quality leader-member exchange (LMX) relationships (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) will be consistent with the uniformly dysfunctional perspective (i.e., managers regard all forms of resistance as dysfunctional and will, therefore, assign lower performance evaluations to lower LMX subordinates regardless of the way they resist) and that managers' perceptions of subordinates' resistance in higher quality LMX relationships will be consistent with a multifunctional perspective (i.e., managers regard some forms of resistance as being more functional than others and, therefore, managers' evaluations of higher LMX subordinates will vary depending on the way they resist). Using a two-study design, we then examine the moderating effects of LMX-the extent to which manager-subordinate relationships are characterized by a high degree of mutual trust, respect, and loyalty (i.e., high-LMX relationships) or are more contractually defined exchanges based on limited trust and in-role interactions (i.e., low LMX relationships; Uhl-Bien, Graen, & Scandura, 2000) -on the relationship between subordinates' resistance and managers' evaluations of subordinates' incident-specific performance (Study 1) and performance in general (Study 2).
Theoretical Background

Alternative Perspectives on Subordinates' Resistance
Subordinates' resistance as uniformly dysfunctional. Falbe and Yukl (1992) identified three qualitatively different responses to managers' downward influence attempts, two that reflect conformity (i.e., commitment and compliance) and one that reflects nonconformity (i.e., resistance). Commitment refers to responses in which the target internalizes the influence objective and is willing to work hard to accomplish it, compliance involves reluctant and unenthusiastic conformity, and resistance involves instances in which the target is opposed to the request and withholds performing it. Because most organizational-influence research has emphasized interactions in which agents get their way (i.e., the target's response reflects commitment or compliance), less is known about situations in which targets resist managers' influence attempts. According to Yukl (2002) , to resist managers' influence attempts, subordinates make excuses about why the request cannot be carried out, try to persuade the agent to withdraw or change the request, ask higher authorities to overrule the agent's request, delay acting in the hope that the agent will forget about the request, make a pretense of complying but try to sabotage the task, or refuse to carry out the request. (p. 143) However, despite the variety of resistance tactics suggested by Yukl, management research has typically conceptualized subordinates' resistance to downward influence attempts as a unidimensional construct (e.g., Barry & Shapiro, 1992; Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Yukl et al., 1996) .
Moreover, although management theorists have recognized that resistance is an appropriate response to unethical or inadvisable influence attempts and have provided guidelines concerning how subordinates should resist inappropriate requests made by superiors (e.g., Chaleff, 1995; Whetten & Cameron, 1991) , most management research has treated subordinates' resistance as an indicator of the ineffective use of interpersonal influence tactics (Brower & Abolafia, 1995) . For example, Maslyn, Farmer, and Fedor (1996) characterized influence attempts that culminate in resistance as "failed" influence, and Tepper, Eisenbach, Kirby, and Potter (1998) characterized resistance episodes as being indicative of managerial ineffectiveness. Fu and Yukl (2000) measured influence effectiveness using a scale in which high scores were associated with getting the "target person … to do what the agent wants" (p. 258). Studies conducted by Falbe and Yukl (1992) and Yukl et al. (1996) also illustrate this perspective. In these studies, influence effectiveness was operationalized by coding influence outcomes as a continuous variable with resistance equal to 1, compliance equal to 2, and commitment equal to 3, and treating higher scores as indicators of greater effectiveness.
Subordinates' resistance as multifunctional. A rich body of social psychological research has identified circumstances in which resistance involves overcoming strong situational pressures to conform to decisions or courses of action that are obviously incorrect (Asch, 1951) , inadvisable (Janis, 1972) , or unethical (Milgram, 1963) . Nonconformity in the Milgram studies, for example, has been referred to as principled dissent, conscientious objection, and constructive resistance. Of course, the Milgram studies, which involve inappropriate requests by authority figures to injure a third party, differ from the sources of influence that management researchers typically investigate. The group dynamics literature suggests that groups may influence the behavior of members by developing and enforcing norms that are counterproductive (e.g., withholding productivity) and that violating those norms may be a desirable response from the organization's standpoint (Feldman, 1984; Hackman, 1976) . These research traditions suggest that there may be instances in which resistance represents a constructive response to routine organizational influence attempts (Darley, 1995; Gamson, Fireman, & Rytina, 1982) .
Consistent with that perspective, communication researchers (e.g., Alberts, Miller-Rassulo, & Hecht, 1991; Burroughs, Kearney, & Plax, 1989; Dillard, 1990; Lamude & Scudder, 1992; Lim, 1990; Manusov, 1989; McLaughlin, Cody, & Robey, 1980; McQuillen, Higgenbotham, & Cummings, 1984; O'Hair, Cody, & O'Hair, 1991) routinely treat resistance to interpersonal influence as a multifunctional construct, assuming that resistance consists of distinguishable subdimensions and that agents use different resistance behaviors to accomplish different objectives. As examples, Manusov (1989) inductively identified five tactics individuals use to resist friends' influence attempts, Alberts et al. (1991) inductively derived four strategies with which students resist offers of drugs and alcohol, and McLaughlin et al. (1980) deductively derived a five-factor model of resistance individuals use in conflictive interactions. Moreover, in the one communication study that explored the consequences of different kinds of resistance, Lim (1990) found that experimental respondents were more verbally aggressive when their task was to persuade someone who resisted in an unfriendly manner (characterized by disagreeing with what the respondent said, eschewing the use of in-group pronouns like we and us, and offering negative feedback such as head shaking) as opposed to a friendly manner (characterized by agreeing with the respondent as long as agreement does not imply conformity, acknowledging that the respondent did a good job on his or her part of a task, showing solidarity by using ingroup pronouns, and giving positive feedback such as head nodding).
Taken together, these studies suggest that influence agents distinguish between different kinds of resistance, although the ways people resist varies across contexts. Despite these discrepancies, however, there are some common themes that emerge across communication contexts and that provide clues as to the kinds of resistance strategies individuals use in formal organizations. Specifically, the communication typologies differentiate between behaviors designed to voice disagreement without damaging the relationship with the influence agent (e.g., "politeness," Manusov, 1989; "rebuttal," Burroughs et al., 1989; Lamude & Scudder, 1992; and "negotiation," McLaughlin et al., 1980; O'Hair et al., 1991) and aggressive responses designed to frustrate the agent (e.g., "nonnegotiation," McLaughlin et al., 1980; O'Hair et al., 1991; "deception," Alberts et al., 1991; and "disruption," Burroughs et al., 1989) .
In the only studies that have explored resistance as a multidimensional construct in organizations, Tepper, Schriesheim, et al. (1998) and Tepper, Duffy, and Shaw (2001) distinguished between two kinds of resistance that closely parallel these broad themes. In both studies, the resistance dimensions were termed constructive resistance, which involves efforts to open a meaningful dialogue with managers, and dysfunctional resistance, which involves efforts to disrupt work flows and to thwart and undermine the manager. However, because these terms conflate resistance behavior and resistance outcomes, we employed labels for the two dimensions that are descriptive of subordinates' resistance behavior. For example, rather than using the term constructive to refer to behaviors like convincing the agent that a request may not be worthwhile, suggesting that a request should be done differently, or explaining that the presumed benefits of performing a request will not be realized, we used the label negotiating, an outcome-neutral term that more accurately describes the item content and that has precedent in communication research. In addition, we eschewed the term dysfunctional to capture behaviors like ignoring requests, making a half-hearted effort, or just saying "no," invoking instead the outcome-neutral label refusing. Tepper, Schriesheim, et al. (1998) found that subordinates' self-reported refusing was negatively related to managers' evaluations of their performance and that negotiating was positively related to performance. Tepper et al. (2001) found that subordinates were more likely to resist (negotiate and refuse) when their supervisors were more abusive but that these effects depended on the subordinate's personality; conscientious subordinates, on the other hand, resisted hostile supervisors by negotiating, and less conscientious subordinates resisted by refusing. These studies provide support for the idea that although resistance may be a less desirable response to downward influence compared to commitment or compliance, subordinates use different kinds of resistance tactics to accomplish different objectives, and that managers are more favorably disposed to subordinates who negotiate as opposed to those who refuse.
Subordinates' Resistance and Managers' Evaluations of Subordinates' Performance
To summarize the preceding discussion, the uniformly dysfunctional perspective would predict that managers will regard both forms of resistance, negotiating and refusing, as equally ineffective. That is, managers will assign low performance ratings to subordinates regardless of the way they resist. In contrast, from the multifunctional perspective, it may be predicted that managers respond differently to refusing and negotiating; specifically, managers will assign lower performance ratings when subordinates refuse compared to when they negotiate. In this section, we develop the argument that both perspectives have validity and that support for the uniformly dysfunctional and multifunctional perspectives depends on the nature of the exchange relationship between the manager and the subordinate. Specifically, we contend that the uniformly dysfunctional model will be supported in the case of lower quality LMX relationships and that the multifunctional model will be supported with respect to higher quality LMX relationships. LMX theory and research describes differentiated relationships between managers and subordinates (e.g., Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1991 . These relationships are generated through social exchanges (Liden, Sparrowe, & Wayne, 1997) in which dyad members undergo a series of interactions based on reciprocity (Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003) and testing processes (Uhl-Bien et al., 2000) . LMX quality forms relatively quickly, from a few days to a few weeks, and remains relatively stable once established (Dockery & Steiner, 1990; Liden, Wayne, & Stilwell, 1993) . Higher quality relationships involve reciprocity that is based on mutual interest (i.e., rather than self-interest), low immediacy (i.e., long time spans of reciprocity), and low equivalence (i.e., exchanges that do not have to be of equivalent value) (Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003) . As a result, dyad members do not worry about "score keeping" (Mitchell & Uhl-Bien, 2004) , and they monitor only for major trust violations (Lewicki & Bunker, 1996) . Managers view high-LMX subordinates as "trusted assistants" who could "cover" for them if needed, which allows these subordinates greater negotiating latitude (Dansereau, Graen, & Haga, 1975; Graen & Cashman, 1975) and decision influence (Scandura, Graen, & Novak, 1986 ). Lower quality LMX relationships involve low communication, lack of respect, and an absence of loyalty (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1991; Uhl-Bien et al., 2000) ; managers see low-LMX individuals as "hired hands" (Dansereau et al., 1975) who are self-interested and untrustworthy (Uhl-Bien & Maslyn, 2003) .
Given this as background, what role does LMX play in managers' responses to subordinates' resistance? According to the resistance literature, managers should infer that subordinates are relatively unconcerned about task accomplishment when they ignore managers' requests, respond in a passive-aggressive fashion, or blatantly refuse (i.e., when they resist by refusing; Tepper, Schriesheim, et al., 1998) . Moreover, to the extent refusing communicates that the subordinate is uncooperative, managers should see little likelihood that this form of resistance will culminate in acceptable task outcomes (e.g., high-quality work) or relational outcomes (e.g., favorable relations between the manager and subordinate). Refusing, therefore, has the potential to engender dysfunctional conflict, disagreement between parties that can interfere with group and organizational effectiveness (Brehmer, 1976) . On the basis of these arguments, we can expect that managers will be unreceptive to refusing as a resistance tactic.
Our review of the LMX literature, however, suggests the need to qualify this prediction. Specifically, we expected that managers would view low-LMX refusers and high-LMX refusers differently. In low-LMX relationships, managers should perceive refusing negatively and in keeping with the low level of trust and generally poor quality of the relationship between the parties. In high-LMX relationships, which are more mature partnerships based on trust, openness, and mutual support, managers should be inclined to give subordinates who refuse the benefit of the doubt (e.g., recognizing that the high-LMX subordinate may have had good reason to refuse). This line of reasoning is supported by evidence suggesting that, regardless of subordinates' actual level of performance, managers generally assign higher performance evaluations to high-LMX subordinates compared with low-LMX subordinates (Duarte, Goodson, & Klich, 1994) . Consequently, we expected that high-LMX subordinates who refuse would be evaluated more favorably than low-LMX subordinates who refuse, although these differences would be modest, given that refusing is generally regarded to be an undesirable means of communicating with one's supervisor (Tepper, Schriesheim, et al., 1998) .
In contrast, we expected that more dramatic differences would emerge with regard to negotiating. Specifically, when high-LMX subordinates ask managers to rethink the logic or need for a request (i.e., when they resist by negotiating), managers should interpret the behavior as a constructive and developmental response, one that fits well with the kinds of contributions expected of trusted subordinates. For example, within the context of a high-LMX, "trusted assistant," relationship, questioning the efficacy or logic of a downward influence attempt should be perceived as a sincere attempt to help the manager avoid unnecessary expenditures of resources (e.g., time and effort) or to provide an alternative perspective that the manager had not considered. Hence, managers should evaluate high-LMX subordinates more favorably when they resist by negotiating. In contrast, because managers tend to have low expectations of, and trust in, low-LMX subordinates and question the initiative and intentions of low-LMX subordinates (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1995) , managers should be skeptical of, and assign lower performance evaluations to, low-LMX subordinates who negotiate.
Taken together, these arguments suggest an interaction between subordinates' resistance and LMX. To specify the form of the interaction, we expected that managers would assign lower performance evaluations to low-LMX subordinates when they resist by refusing and when they resist by negotiating. This pattern of low performance ratings across the two types of resistance is consistent with the uniformly dysfunctional model. In contrast, and in keeping with the multifunctional model, we expected that managers would assign higher performance evaluations to high-LMX subordinates who negotiate compared with high-LMX subordinates who refuse (although we anticipated that high-LMX refusers would be rated more favorably than low-LMX refusers). We therefore tested the following predictions:
Hypothesis 1: Leader-member exchange will moderate the relationship between subordinates' resistance and managers' evaluations of subordinates' performance. Managers will assign lower performance evaluations to low-LMX subordinates regardless of whether they resist by refusing or negotiating (Hypothesis 1a), and managers will assign higher performance evaluations to high-LMX subordinates who resist by negotiating compared with high-LMX subordinates who resist by refusing (Hypothesis 1b).
Overview of the Research
Resistance behavior may be investigated through the analysis of specific resistance incidents (e.g., Falbe & Yukl, 1992) or of the frequency with which individuals resist (e.g., Tepper et al., 2001) . The former approach allows for a fine-grained analysis of the ways individuals perceive and respond to specific instances of resistance; the latter approach decontextualizes resistance tactics and outcomes, thereby permitting researchers to investigate relationships between the frequency with which individuals resist and broader organizational phenomena. Hence, each approach has advantages, and choosing one over the other produces trade-offs in terms of the kinds of conclusions that researchers may draw. It is also important to note that, with respect to previous investigations of resistance in organizations, the studies that treated resistance as uniformly dysfunctional used research designs that focused on specific resistance incidents (Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Fu & Yukl, 2000; Maslyn et al., 1996; Yukl et al., 1996) , and the two studies that treated resistance as multifunctional explored the frequency with which subordinates resist (Tepper, Schriesheim, et al., 1998; Tepper et al., 2001) . That is, the uniformly dysfunctional model derives from incident studies, and the multifunctional model derives from studies of the frequency with which subordinates resist.
We therefore conducted two studies, employing different methods and operationalizations of our key variables. In Study 1, managers were first cued to recall instances in which one of their subordinates either refused or negotiated and then asked to provide incident-specific evaluations of their subordinates' performance. Study 2 involved a field survey in which subordinates reported the frequency with which they refused and negotiated, and their managers provided a standard rating of their subordinates' performance.
Study 1: Method
Sample and Procedure
We solicited respondents using a snowballing procedure that has been used successfully in other studies to generate heterogeneous samples of managers (e.g., Martins, Eddleston, & Veiga, 2002) . We asked 185 evening MBA students to distribute up to five surveys to individuals employed in a supervisory capacity at the time of the study. We developed two surveys, one that cued respondents to recall a refusing incident and one that cued respondents to recall a negotiating incident. Both surveys asked respondents to "think about the most recent instance in which you tried to get one of your employees to do something and your employee responded in one or more of the following ways." The refusing survey followed with "he or she refused to perform your request" and "he or she ignored your request." The negotiating survey followed with "he or she explained that what you requested should be done a different way," "he or she argued that the request would not yield the benefits you expected," and "he or she tried to convince you to reassess whether the request was worthwhile." To reduce the effects of response bias, including experimental demand, the students were instructed to give each manager one survey (refusing or negotiating) and to not allow them to see the contents of the other form. As a further check, we included an open-ended question at the end of each survey that asked the participants to explain what they thought the purpose of the study was. No participants correctly guessed the purpose of our research.
Five hundred twenty-one managers agreed to participate in the study, 375 of whom were able to recall a resistance episode that fit the cue they received. Eliminating surveys with missing data (n = 28) produced a sample size of 347 (174 refusing and 173 negotiating). The average age of the respondents was between 35 and 39 years old, and 65% were male. Open-ended responses to the instruction, "Please explain what you were trying to get your employee to do," suggested that the content of the requests varied. Examples of the kinds of requests described by respondents included performing tasks that were initially assigned to someone else (e.g., making a presentation to higher management), completing urgent tasks (e.g., working overtime to meet a deadline), completing routine tasks (e.g., simple errands and clerical activities), and performing tasks that required a significant investment of time and effort (e.g., rewriting and editing a 200-page report and traveling across the country to meet with a dissatisfied client).
Measures
Both surveys included measures of the subordinate's incident-specific performance with respect to the manager's request and perceptions of LMX. For all analyses, we coded refusing equal to 1 and negotiating equal to 2.
Performance. Respondents evaluate their subordinate's incident-specific performance using a four-item scale. The items consisted of a 7-point semantic differential scale and were prefaced with instructions to "circle the number from 1 to 7 that best describes how you rate your employee's performance on this occasion." The anchor pairs were unfavorable-favorable, disruptive-helpful, ineffective-effective, and incompetent-competent.
Leader-member exchange. The respondents also completed Graen, Novak, and Sommerkamp's (1982) seven-item Leader-Member Exchange Scale (supervisors' version). Respondents used a 5-point response scale (1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree) to rate their level of agreement with such items as "I would characterize my working relationship with my subordinate as extremely effective" and "I understand my subordinate's problems and needs." We averaged the item scores to form total scores for LMX.
Because the measures of performance and LMX were based on data collected from a single source, we assessed the dimensionality of the items using confirmatory factor analysis. We compared three rival ways of modeling the item covariance matrix: a null model in which all items loaded on separate factors, a one-factor model in which all items loaded on a common factor, and a twofactor model in which the items designed to measure performance and LMX loaded on two separate, correlated factors. The fit of the two-factor model, χ 2 (43) = 352.57, p < .01, was superior to the fit of the one-factor model, Δχ 2 (1) = 1,125.03, p < .01, and the two-factor model's Comparative Fit Index (.87) and root mean square error of approximation (.09) were reasonable, especially given that all cross-loadings were constrained to zero and no "garbage parameters" (e.g., correlated errors were estimated. All the lambda parameters for the twofactor model were greater than .60, and all were significant (p < .01), and the disattenuated correlation between performance and LMX was .47 (p < .01). Consequently, we averaged the appropriate item scores to form total scores for performance and LMX.
Control variables.
Even though previous research has yielded conflicting results regarding the relationships between rater characteristics and performance ratings (Bretz, Milkovich, & Read, 1992) , we nevertheless controlled for several background variables prior to testing our hypothesis. Specifically, we controlled for the manager's sex (1 = male, 2 = female), age (1 = 18 to 24, 2 = 25 to 29, 3 = 30 to 34, 4 = 35 to 39, 5 = 40 to 44, 6 = 45 to 49, 7 = 50 to 54, 8 = 55 to 59, 9 = 60 to 64, and 10 = over 64), education (1 = high school, 2 = some college, 3 = college degree, 4 = advanced degree), and tenure with the subordinate (1 = less than 6 months, 2 = 6 months to 1 year, 3 = 1 year to 2 years, 4 = 2 years to 3 years, 5 = 3 years to 5 years, 6 = more than 5 years). In addition, because managers may be more accepting of subordinates who fail to perform actions that fall outside of their job description (cf. Organ, 1988) , we controlled for role definitions, the extent to which the request was part of the subordinates' job requirements or beyond their job requirements. We measured role definitions with four items that asked the managers to report the extent to which the request was "part of his or her job" (reverse scored), "beyond his or her job description," "something that was above and beyond the call of duty," and "a requirement of his or her job" (reverse scored). The items were prefaced with the statement, "What I asked my employee to do was," and the response scale ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. We averaged the item scores and coded the responses so that higher scores meant that the request constituted extra-role behavior, a contribution that exceeded the subordinate's job description. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for the study variables. The criterion variable, performance, correlated significantly with resistance, managers' age, role definitions, and LMX. The signs on these correlations suggest that managers assigned higher performance ratings when subordinates negotiated rather than refused, the manager was older, the manager perceived the request to be extra-role, and LMX was higher.
Study 1: Results and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics
Multiple Regression Results
We tested our hypotheses by regressing performance on the control variables (Step 1), the main effects of resistance and LMX (Step 2), and an interaction term consisting of the Resistance × LMX cross product (Step 3). Table 2 shows the regression results. The column labeled "Step 1" in Table 2 shows that the control variables explained 11% of the variance in performance ratings (p < .01). The beta weights associated with this equation suggest that managers assigned higher performance ratings when the manager was older and when the request was extrarole. The column labeled "Step 2" in Table 2 shows that the main effects of resistance and LMX accounted for an additional 14% of the variance in performance ratings (p < .001). The signs on the beta weights at Step 2 suggest that managers assigned higher performance ratings when subordinates negotiated rather than refused and when LMX was higher.
At
Step 3, the Resistance × LMX interaction term accounted for significant incremental variance in performance ratings (ΔR 2 = .02, p < .01). We plotted this interaction using values of plus and minus one standard deviation around the mean for negotiating and LMX values of 1 (low LMX), 2 (moderate LMX), and 3 (high LMX). We plotted this interaction using resistance values of 1 (refusing) and 2 (negotiating) and values of plus and minus one standard deviation from the mean on LMX (Aiken & West, 1991) . The plot of this effect, which is shown in Figure 1 , suggests that managers assigned lower performance ratings to lower LMX subordinates when they resisted by refusing and when they resisted by negotiating (b = .13, ns). Hence, Hypothesis 1a was supported. Figure 1 also shows that for higher LMX subordinates, managers assigned higher performance evaluations when they resisted by negotiating compared to when they resisted by refusing (b = .40, p < .01); hence, Hypothesis 1b was supported. As expected, higher LMX refusers received higher performance evaluations compared with lower Study 1 results provide support for our contention that managers' evaluations of subordinates' performance will be consistent with a uniformly dysfunctional perspective in the case of lower quality LMX relationships and a multifunctional perspective in the case of higher quality LMX relationships. However, Study 1, which involved an incident-specific examination of managers' evaluations of subordinates who refused and negotiated, is not without methodological limitations. Specifically, cuing managers to recall incidents involving refusing or negotiating tells us little about how the frequency with which subordinates resist may be related to general performance evaluations. To the extent that the most recent resistance incident managers can recall captures atypical behavior on the part of the referent subordinate, there may be little relationship between a manager's incident-specific evaluation of the subordinate and his or her evaluation of the subordinate in general. Second, although the nature of our research design renders common method bias an unlikely explanation for our Study 1 findings (i.e., resistance was operationalized by assigning managers to different cues, and there is no reason to believe that method variance should be stronger across different levels of LMX), the reliance on single-source data is a limitation.
Accordingly, we conducted a second study that focused on the frequency with which subordinates refuse and negotiate and managers' general evaluations of subordinates' performance. To address concerns about common method variance, we employed a dyadic research design in which subordinates reported the frequency with which they refused and negotiated when they resisted their managers' influence attempts, and managers completed a traditional performance rating scale using their subordinate as the referent. In addition, LMX was assessed using an interview protocol with the managers.
As we mentioned earlier, the only study of the frequency of subordinates' resistance suggested that managers evaluate subordinates more favorably when they refuse with low frequency and when they negotiate with high frequency (Tepper, Schriesheim, et al., 1998) , a pattern of findings that provided the basis for what we have referred to as the multifunctional model. As in Study 1, we expected that the multifunctional model would emerge for higher LMX subordinates; the rationale for this is that whereas refusing communicates disregard for the manager's position and an unwillingness to negotiate unwanted requests, engaging in negotiating behaviors should be favorably received in the context of a trusting and supportive supervisor-subordinate relationship (i.e., high LMX). The uniformly dysfunctional model would predict that managers will assign low performance evaluations to subordinates who refuse with high frequency and to subordinates who negotiate with high frequency. That is, refusing and negotiating should be negatively related to managers' ratings of subordinates' performance. As in Study 1, we expected that the uniformly dysfunctional pattern would emerge for lower LMX subordinates whose resistance behavior (be it refusing or negotiating) managers regard with skepticism and mistrust.
Taken together, these arguments lead to the prediction that refusing will be negatively related to performance ratings for both lower LMX subordinates and higher LMX subordinates and that negotiating will be positively related to performance ratings for higher LMX subordinates and negatively related to perfor-mance ratings for lower LMX subordinates. That is, there will be a negative relationship between refusing and performance ratings, and the relationship between negotiating and performance ratings will depend on LMX exchange quality.
Hypothesis 2:
The frequency with which subordinates refuse will be negatively related to managers' evaluations of subordinates' performance (across levels of LMX).
Hypothesis 3: Leader-member exchange will moderate the relationship between the frequency with which subordinates negotiate and managers' evaluations of subordinates' performance; the relationship will be positive when LMX is high, and the relationship will be negative when LMX is low.
Study 2: Method
Sample and Procedure
We collected data from manager-subordinate dyads at 53 branches of a large midwestern financial institution. We developed two surveys, one that was completed by the branch managers and one that was administered to five randomly selected individuals who reported directly to the branch managers. The surveys were coded so that managers' and subordinates' questionnaires could be matched. The surveys were administered by, and returned to, members of the research team, who traveled to each location to have face-to-face meetings with the branch managers and their randomly selected employees. The average age of the managers was 42 years, and 48% were women; the average age of the subordinates was 34 years, and 26% were women. Complete data were available for 207 manager-subordinate dyads. Chi-square tests suggested that the age, sex, and tenure distributions of the managers and subordinates were representative of the organization's population of employees.
Measures
Resistance. The subordinates completed Tepper et al.'s (2001) measures of resistance to downward influence attempts, which capture the two dimensions of refusing (seven items) and negotiating (four items). The subordinates were instructed to indicate the frequency with which they used the behavior described in each item when they resist doing something their manager asks them to do. Illustrative items are "I just say no," "I ignore my boss" (refusing), "I convince my boss to reassess whether or not the task is worthwhile," and "I explain that the task will not yield the expected benefits" (negotiating). The 5-point response scale consisted of the following anchors: 1 = I cannot remember ever using this tactic, 2 = I very seldom use this tactic, 3 = I occasionally use this tactic, 4 = I use this tactic moderately often, and 5= I use this tactic very often.
Prior to forming the resistance subscales, we assessed the dimensionality of the items using maximum likelihood confirmatory factor analysis. We compared three rival ways of modeling the item covariance matrix: a null model in which all items loaded on separate factors; a one-factor model in which all items loaded on a common factor; and a two-factor model in which the items designed to mea-sure refusing and negotiating loaded on two separate, correlated factors. The fit of the two-factor model, χ 2 (43) = 81.62, p < .01, was superior to the fit of the onefactor model, Δχ 2 (1) = 69.27, p < .01. Moreover, the two-factor model's Comparative Fit Index (.88) and root mean square error of approximation (.07) were reasonable. The lambda parameters for the two-factor model ranged from .40 to .85, and all were significant (p < .01). The disattenuated correlation between the latent refusing and negotiating constructs was .22 (p < .01). Consequently, we averaged the appropriate item scores to form total scores for refusing and negotiating.
Performance. The managers rated their subordinates' performance using a fiveitem measure that was adapted from Mott's (1972) scale. Previous research suggests that the measure had good reliability and validity as a predictor of objective performance indicators (Fulk & Wendler, 1982; Schriesheim, 1980; Schriesheim, Neider, & Scandura, 1998 ). An illustrative item follows. "Productivity-quantity: Thinking of the various things that this person does for his or her job, how much is he or she producing (e.g., units produced, customers served, forms completed, pallets loaded, etc.)? Check one:" (A = his or her production is very low, B = it is fairly low, C = it is neither high nor low, D = it is fairly high, and E = it is very high).
The other items measured production quality, production efficiency, anticipating problems and solving them satisfactorily, and awareness of potential new solutions. We averaged the item scores to form total scores for performance.
Leader-member exchange. To further minimize the potential problems associated with relying on a single data collection method, we assessed LMX during face-to-face interviews with the managers that took place between 1 and 2 weeks after they completed the survey questionnaires. As part of the interview, the managers were asked to classify each subordinate as fitting into one of the following categories: (a) "I have a close relationship with this employee, one characterized by high levels of trust, loyalty, and mutual respect" (high LMX); (b) "My relationship with this employee may be characterized as extremely formal in the sense that we do no more for one another than is specified by our respective job requirements" (low LMX); or (c) "Somewhere between a close relationship and a formal one" (moderate LMX).
We gave the managers an option of choosing a moderate level because a pilot test with an independent sample of 25 managers from the same organization suggested that many had difficulty classifying their subordinates into a high-LMX or low-LMX group. It is also consistent with LMX theorizing, which describes three groups (Graen & Uhl-Bien, 1991 Uhl-Bien et al., 2000) . In total, the managers classified 66 subordinates as high LMX, 103 as moderate LMX, and 39 as low LMX. We investigated the validity of this method of categorizing manager-subordinate relationships by administering surveys to an independent sample of 97 MBA students who were employed in a managerial capacity. The manager-students received one of three surveys, all of which were prefaced with the statement, "Managers differentiate among their subordinates, establishing one of three kinds of relationships" and the same category descriptions presented above. The three forms of the survey differed in terms of the instructions that followed, which involved a cue to think about a current subordinate with whom the student-manager had a "close working relationship," "a highly formal relationship," or "a relationship that was between close and formal." Eighty-four participants indicated that they had a subordinate who fit the category described in their survey and for purposes of analysis, we coded the surveys as follows: 3 = close (i.e., high LMX, n = 29), 2 = between close and formal (i.e., moderate LMX, n = 30), and 1 = formal (i.e., low LMX, n = 25). The student managers also completed the seven-item LMX scale that we used in Study 1, and we averaged the item scores to form total scores on this measure. The correlation between scores on the three-category coding approach and scores on the traditional paper-and-pencil measure was .89 (p < .001). Hence, the interview protocol we used in Study 2 appears to be a valid means of categorizing subordinates as being high, moderate, or low LMX.
Control variables.
In Study 2, we controlled for subordinates' and managers' sex (1 = male, 2 = female), subordinates' and managers' age (1 = 18 to 24, 2 = 25 to 30, 3= 31 to 40, 4 = 41 to 49, 5= over 50), and subordinates' tenure with the manager (1 = less than 6 months, 2 = 6 months to 1 year, 3 = 1 year to 2 years, 4 = 2 years to 3 years, 5 = 3 years to 5 years, 6 = more than 5 years) prior to testing the hypotheses. Table 3 shows the descriptive statistics for Study 2. The alpha internal-consistency reliability coefficients for the Refusing and Negotiating subscales were acceptable (i.e., ≥ .70; Nunnally & Bernstein, 1994) . Job performance correlated positively with subordinates' age, subordinates' tenure, supervisor's age, subordinates' negotiating, and LMX, and negatively with subordinates' refusing.
Study 2: Results and Discussion
Descriptive Statistics and Intercorrelations
Moderated Regression Results
We tested the hypotheses by regressing performance on the control variables (Step 1); the main effects of LMX, refusing, and negotiating (Step 2); and two two-way interaction terms represented by the Refusing × LMX and Negotiating × LMX cross products (Step 3). Hypothesis 2, that refusing is negatively related to performance across levels of LMX, would be supported if there is a main effect of refusing at Step 2 and the effect of the Refusing × LMX cross product is not significant at Step 3; Hypothesis 3, that LMX moderates the relationship between negotiating and performance, would be supported if the Negotiating × LMX cross product explains significant incremental variance at Step 3 and the plot of the interaction conforms to our predictions. Table 4 shows the regression results.
The column labeled "
Step 1" in Table 4 shows that the control variables accounted for 11% of the variance in performance ratings, which was significant (p < .01). The standardized beta weights suggest that subordinates' age and tenure were positively related to performance, and the effect for subordinates' sex approached significance (p < .10). Older subordinates and subordinates with longer tenure received higher performance evaluations, and female subordinates received higher evaluations compared with men. 
At
Step 2, the main effects of refusing, negotiating, and LMX explained an additional 20% of the variance in performance, which was significant (p < .01). The standardized beta weights suggest that performance was positively related to negotiating and LMX and, consistent with Hypothesis 2, refusing was negatively related to performance.
Step 3, the two-way interaction terms explained an additional 2% of the variance in performance (p < .01). Table 4 shows that the Negotiating × LMX interaction (β = .11, p < .05) was responsible for this effect. We plotted this interaction using values of plus and minus one standard deviation around the mean for negotiating and LMX values of 1 (low LMX), 2 (moderate LMX), and 3 (high LMX). The plot of this interaction, shown in Figure 2 , reveals that Hypothesis 3 was partially supported. The relationship between negotiating and performance was positive for high LMX (b = .30, p < .01) and for moderate LMX (b = .20, p < .05). However, when LMX was low, negotiating and performance were unrelated (b = .08, ns; the predicted negative relationship did not emerge). Low-LMX subordinates received low performance evaluations regardless of the frequency with which they negotiated. It should also be noted that the Refusing × LMX cross product did not explain significant incremental variance in performance, which comports with Hypothesis 2 (refusing was negatively related to performance across levels of LMX).
Taken together, these results provide support for our thesis that managers' evaluations of subordinates' performance are consistent with the uniformly dysfunctional model in the case of low-LMX subordinates (because low-LMX subordinates received generally low evaluations when they refused with high frequency and when they negotiated with high frequency) and the multifunctional model with respect to high-LMX subordinates (because high-LMX subordinates received lower evaluations when they refused with high frequency, and they received favorable evaluations when they negotiated with high frequency). 
General Discussion
Our research contributes to the literature that addresses subordinates' responses to downward influence attempts. Few studies have explored how subordinates resist managers' influence attempts, and most of that work has treated resistance as a unidimensional and uniformly dysfunctional phenomenon. Our research, which was rooted in the assumption that resistance consists of distinguishable subdimensions, tested the idea that managers' evaluations of subordinates depend on the way subordinates resist and the quality of the exchange relationship between the manager and the subordinate.
To summarize our results, we found that managers evaluated lower LMX subordinates negatively regardless of the way they resisted, a pattern that is consistent with what we referred to as the uniformly dysfunctional perspective (i.e., managers regard both refusing and negotiating as dysfunctional). In addition, consistent with the multifunctional perspective, the managers in Study 1 evaluated higher LMX subordinates more favorably when they resisted by negotiating compared with when they resisted by refusing, and the managers in Study 2 evaluated high-LMX subordinates more favorably when they negotiated with higher frequency and less favorably when they refused with higher frequency. Taken together, our findings qualify the work of Falbe and Yukl (1992) and Yukl et al. (1996) , which carries the implicit assumption that all forms of resistance are indicative of managerial ineffectiveness (i.e., the uniformly dysfunctional perspective), and the work of Tepper et al. (2001) , which suggests that managers regard subordinates who negotiate more favorably than subordinates who refuse. As we surmised, each perspective has validity, but only with respect to specific kinds of manager-subordinate relationships.
As expected, the managers in both studies generally rated lower LMX subordinates unfavorably regardless of the way they resisted. In contrast, higher LMX subordinates were rated more favorably when they resisted by negotiating. From the perspective of managers, negotiating by high-LMX subordinates appears to be a well-intended response, one that can be used to open a dialogue when requests warrant elaboration, clarification, or abandonment. However, it would be inappropriate to characterize negotiating as simply the means by which "good" subordinates resist because, in both studies, there was no relationship between LMX and resistance. This can be inferred to mean that lower LMX subordinates are just as likely to negotiate as are higher LMX subordinates but that managers are receptive only to negotiating by higher LMX subordinates.
Contrary to expectations, there was no relationship between negotiating and performance for low-LMX subordinates in Study 2. The uniformly dysfunctional model was supported in the sense that low-LMX subordinates received low performance evaluations when they negotiated with high frequency; however, there was no difference in the performance evaluations received by low-LMX subordinates who negotiated with high frequency and those who negotiated with low frequency. Hence, when it comes to negotiating as a means of resisting downward requests, low-LMX subordinates are "damned if they do and damned if they don't" in the sense that they can expect to receive lower evaluations whether or not they negotiate. More generally, this finding is consistent with the idea that managers generally assign low performance ratings to low-LMX subordinates compared with high-LMX subordinates (Duarte et al., 1994; Kacmar, Witt, Zivnuska, & Gully, 2003; Wilhelm, Herd, & Steiner, 1993) .
Among the control variables we included in the two studies, only role definitions with respect to specific requests in Study 1 were a strong and consistent predictor of managers' evaluations of subordinates' performance. As expected, managers assigned higher performance ratings when the request consisted of activities that exceeded the subordinate's job description. This finding is consistent with the literature that addresses citizenship behavior in organizations in that we would expect managers to look unfavorably on subordinates who withhold inrole behaviors compared with subordinates who withhold extra-role behaviors (Organ, 1988) . The fact that none of the demographic control variables were consistently related to performance ratings was not unexpected given that previous research has revealed conflicting findings regarding the effects of rater and ratee characteristics on performance ratings (Bretz et al., 1992) .
Our research is not without limitations. One limitation has to do with the effect sizes associated with the interaction terms in our two studies. Specifically, the two-way interactions in Study 1 and in Study 2 explained only 2% of the variance in performance ratings. However, it has been argued that given the difficulty of detecting moderating effects in multiple regression analyses (McClelland & Judd, 1993) , even significant effect sizes of 1% are "worth taking seriously" (Aguinis, 2004: 141) . Hence, although modest, the effect sizes that emerged in our two studies are not unimportant.
A second limitation is that the nature of our studies precludes deriving causal inferences consistent with our conceptual framework; specifically, neither study allows us to dismiss the possibility that performance causes subordinates' resistance rather than the other way around. For that reason, our findings should be interpreted with caution, and our investigation should be viewed as merely the first step in the process of unraveling the performance implications of subordinates' resistance. Future research should make use of experimental and/or longitudinal methods so as to better articulate the causal sequencing of the variables we studied.
A third limitation of our research is that we did not explore the means by which LMX moderates the relationships between subordinates' resistance and managers' evaluations of subordinates' performance. One interpretation of our findings has to do with the concept of psychological contracts, the idea that organization members form expectations as to the obligations underlying the employment relationship (Rousseau, 1995) . Rousseau (1998) has argued that applications of psychological contract theory and research have the potential to further our understanding of LMX relationships by shedding light on the expectations and obligations that are idiosyncratic to high-LMX and low-LMX relationships. Hence, for example, our findings with respect to high-LMX relationships could be interpreted to mean that, from the perspective of managers, high-LMX subordinates may breach their psychological contract only when they refuse with high frequency. Another way of thinking about our findings has to do with the attributions managers make for subordinates' resistance. In the wake of resistance episodes, it may be argued that managers evaluate high-LMX subordinates more favorably because they make more external attributions for high-LMX subordinates' resistance (e.g., the request was inappropriate) and more internal attributions for low-LMX subordinates' resistance (e.g., the subordinate was lazy or obstinate). Future research could explore these ideas by assessing managers' perceptions of the psychological contract with their subordinates who resist and by measuring managers' attributions for subordinates' resistance.
A final limitation is that in both studies, we measured LMX exchange from one perspective, the manager. In some studies involving matched pairs of supervisors and subordinates, researchers have reported modest convergence between supervisor perceptions of LMX and subordinate perceptions of LMX, as well as evidence suggesting that the relationships between LMX and other variables differ depending on whether LMX is measured from the supervisors' perspective or the subordinates' perspective (e.g., Liden et al., 1993; Scandura et al., 1986; Schriesheim et al., 1998) . Consequently, although we believe that our study takes an important first step by demonstrating that supervisors' perceptions of LMX play a role in explaining when the uniformly dysfunctional and multifunctional models will be observed, future research should explore the extent to which similar findings emerge when LMX quality is measured from the subordinates' perspective.
Having acknowledged the limitations of our research, we would be remiss if we did not highlight an important feature of our work-that we obtained converging findings across studies that made use of diverse methods and operationalizations of the key variables. As we noted earlier, resistance behavior has been studied at the level of specific incidents and in terms of the frequency with which individuals use various resistance tactics. In fact, the uniformly dysfunctional model emerged from studies that relied primarily on incident-specific research designs (e.g., Falbe & Yukl, 1992; Yukl et al., 1996) , whereas the multifunctional model grew out of studies that explored the frequency with which subordinates refuse and negotiate (e.g., Tepper et al., 2001; Tepper, Schriesheim, et al., 1998) . Our study is the first to use both approaches simultaneously and in so doing illustrates the advantages of multimethod research in studies of manager-subordinate influence processes (Yukl, 1989) . By showing that managers assign more favorable incident-specific evaluations to high-LMX subordinates who negotiate rather than refuse (Study 1) and that in the aggregate, and across the many influence episodes that occur in manager-subordinate relationships, managers evaluate higher LMX subordinates more favorably when they negotiate with higher frequency (Study 2), we were able to triangulate in on the role that LMX plays in the relationship between subordinates' resistance and managers' evaluations of subordinates' performance (Rogelberg & Brooks-Laber, 2002) . Our research has implications for management practice. From the perspective of managers, negotiating by high-LMX subordinates appears to be a constructive and developmental response. For example, high-LMX subordinates should be more likely to have their grievances addressed when they use negotiation as compared to when they resist in a passive-aggressive fashion or when they blatantly refuse their managers' requests. It follows that subordinates' resistance can be a useful source of feedback for managers who value their subordinates' input. Whereas refusing has few advantages, negotiating in the form of requesting clarification or pointing out potential problems may help managers avoid ethical violations (Graham, 1986) and mistakes that could adversely affect the organization's bottom line (Van Dyne, Cummings, & Parks, 1995) . However, to the extent managers are not receptive to low-LMX subordinates' negotiating, a potentially valuable source of input may be overlooked. Consequently, it would be helpful to incorporate in management training programs the understanding that among the costs of dividing subordinates into high-and low-LMX groups is the possibility that managers may dismiss worthwhile feedback from low-LMX subordinates simply because they do not trust the source.
